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Export firms are often assumed to stabilize destination market prices in the face of
nominal exchange rate changes in order to protect market share. We show that standard tests.of
such pricing to market fail to discriminate against the alternative hypothesis ofmenu costs. As
a case study, we examine the characteristics and determinants of changes in the cover prices of
The Economist magazine in a sample of twelve countries over the floating rateperiod. We find
that, while the law of one price fails, there is no evidence of systematicattempts to offset
nominal exchange rate movements. Instead, the findings are consistent withmenu cost driven
pricing behavior.
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and NBER1 Introduction
The slow response of the US trade balance to the dollar depreciation in the mid-1980s has
often been blamed on foreign exporters' non-competitive pricing strategies:
This phenomenon results from the choice of foreign producers to boost profit
margins as their currencies depreciate against the dollar and to allow these
margins to narrow so as to maintain market share as their currencies appreciate
against the dollarforeign producers widened their profit margins considerably
during the 1980-84 appreciation of the dollar. This provided them ample room
to narrow profit margins by limiting price increases and thus maintain market
share as the dollar depreciated. Indeed, non-oil import prices actually declined
in 1985 and began to rise only in 1986.
1987 Economic Report of the President, p.116.
In response to these developments, a substantial and growing literature on pricing in
international markets has come into existence, increasingly replacing the classical paradigm
of the law of one price (LOOP) by models explicitly incorporating
non-competitive market structures.1 In these pricing to market (PTM) models, firms
charge different local prices across export markets, reflecting the particular local competitive
situation, and typicafly absorb part of any exchange rate movement by altering the home
currency export price, so that there is incomplete pass-through of exchange rate movements
to local prices.
An understanding of the pricing behavior of firms operating in multiple international
markets is of considerable interest: incomplete passthrough has important implications for
the ability of nominal exchange rate changes, (whether under fixed or floating rates), to
equilibrate trade imbalances. In this paper, we argue that more research on pricing behavior
in international markets is needed. Specifically, we challenge the view that incomplete
passthrough and strategic price setting are two sides of the same coin. We show that
the combination of menu costs (MC) and invoicing in the foreign currency -acommon
practice for non-US exporters- will lead to an observationally undistinguishable sluggish
response of current prices to current exchange rate movements, particularly if aggregate
1See Dornbusch (1987), Froot and Klemperer (1989), Krugman (1987) inter alia.
3price indices are examined. Incomplete pass-through may thus reflect postponed, rather
than deliberately forestalled, adjustment -withsignificantly different policy implications.
The danger of misinterpreting menu cost driven delays as deliberate strategic price setting is
particularly acute in studies focusing on broad price indices which hide the tell-tale pattern
of individual price adjustments. Unfortunately, given the scarcity of individual price series
on internationally traded goods much of the existing literature [Hooper and Mann (1989),
Knetter (1989, 1993), Marston, Feenstra (1989), Feenstra et al. (1993), Harrison (1993),
inter alia] has had to rely on multi-product or multi-firm price indices. Complementing
the aggregative studies with micro data-sets focusing on a single firm and single product
will, while losing generality, provide additional insights into price-setting behavior. In this
paper, we therefore take a detailed look at the characteristics of one such micro dataset,
covering a single homogenous product sold in a large number of countries —thecover prices
of The Economist magazine.
The dataset spans eleven European countries and the United States over the period
1973-1990; and thus provides a rich setting in which to examine optimal pricing behavior in
international markets. Ex ante, a number of characteristics suggest the potential presence
of PTM: The Economist is a differentiated product whose price is quoted in the foreign
currency and whose time-sensitive nature severely limits international arbitrage possibili-
ties. The dataset has a number of other desirable features as well. First, the product is,
by definition, perfectly homogenous. Second, the time-series of prices reflects the pricing
decisions of a single producer so that it is possible to study both why and when individual
price changes occurred. Moreover, there is no danger of spurious effects arising from com-
positional, or aggregation, problems. Third, the various destination markets differ along
several dimensions, including the average rate of local inflation, and the degree of bilateral
exchange rate variability with the production country (the United Kingdom).
In line with a sizeable literature, we are easily able to reject the law of one price, whether
in levels or in first-differences, and we estimate exchange rate pass-through coefficients that
are significantly lower than unity. On the basis of these standard tests, we would thus
conclude that The Economist is priced to market. Yet a more detailed look at the pricing
decisions reveals substantially more support for MC-driven than for PTM-driven incomplete
passthrough. While we would not like to draw any broad conclusions about international
pricing behavior on the basis of a single (perhaps atypical) product, our results do suggest
4that the presence of menu costs, coupled with invoicing in the importers' currency, can lead
to spurious findings of pricing to market behavior.
The remainder of the paper is set out in four parts. We first outline the PTM and
the menu cost models of pricing behavior. We then present some descriptive statistics for
the micro-dataset and present the standard PTM tests, before turning to a more detailed
probit analysis to discriminate between PTM and MC determinants of pricing decisions.
2 Alternative Models of Pricing Behavior
In this section, we briefly sketch two alternative approaches to pricing behavior in interna-
tional markets to distinguish between models in which incomplete short run passthrough
reflects optimal (and strategic) price-setting behavior and models in which such deviations
reflect a failure to adjust nominal prices sufficiently frequently (due, for example, to "menu"
costs).
2.1 Pricing To Market
Consider a firm that produces both for its domestic market and for export to n —1other
countries. The nth country is the reference country (in our case, the United Kingdom). In
each market the firm may face competition from producers located in its own country; in
the foreign market; or a third country. The demand function in country i and at time t is
given by Q,(P), where Q, is the firm's exports to that market and P, the price expressed
in terms of the destination market's currency. Export prices expressed in the reference
currency (in our case, Sterling) will be written P, = whereis the exchange rate
expressed in units of the foreign currency per unit of the reference currency (so that 1
and an increase in E constitutes an appreciation of the Pound). For notational convenience
we also write the reference country price as P, = P.
The firm is assumed to maximize the domestic currency value of its profits:
T p*ri Ip*\ MaxII —C(>Q,) (1)
t=o 1=1 i=1
whereT is the planning horizon of the firm (which may be infinity), 6 its discount rate
(which may be the market interest rate) and CO denotes the cost function. The first-order
conditions imply:





and hence the passthrough elasticity is given by:
dlog(P)—dlog[(1+pt)]
dlog(Et) dlog(E1t)
whereisthe elasticity of demand in country i and in period t, as perceived by the
firm,andiisdefined as the mark-up. The perceived demand elasticity -and hence the
passthrough of exchange rate changes- depends upon the market structure in the destination
country, opening a wide field of possibilities. If consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
and monopolistic competition prevails, then iisconstant, and depends upon the elasticity
of substitution across brands. If the demand function exhibits a constant elasticity of
demand, then iisconstant over time but may vary across countries. If demand becomes
less elastic as the local currency price rises then the optimal markup decreases as the
reference currency appreciates. As Kasa [1993] notes, the generic PTM model (2) thus
covers an extraordinary wide range of pricing responses.
The empirical literature typically attempts to overcome this embarrassment of riches
by augmenting the null hypothesis with the assumption of a constant elasticity of demand.
Dividing (2) by its counterpart for the reference country and taking logarithms gives:
—= log(l+ iz,) —log(1+ JIng) (4)
Under the assumption that demand elasticities are time-invariant and using panel data
one can then estimate:
Pd =Q +I3p + 7Cd+u (5)
where the null hypothesis of perfect competition (and thus no pricing to market) is
=0,/3 =1,Yi =0V i =l,...n—1.There are two alternative hypotheses. If c 0
then the firm is pricing to market —thatis, charging different (Sterling equivalent) prices
according to the destination market. If c,0 and y <0,the demand function does
not exhibit a constant elasticity and the firm does not pass exchange rate movements fully
through to local prices.
6A variant of this level equation underlies most PTM studies; but the equation is also
often estimated in first differences (Knetter [1993]):
=&r+ f3L1pg+ 'y,ejt+ u, (6)
where the null hypothesis is 'y0 V i =1,...n—1. The difference version however loses
some potentially important information from the levels regression: assuming that exchange
rates and nominal prices are non-stationary (which they certainly are in our dataset),
equation (4) implies that there is a cointegrating relationship between domestic prices and
export prices, unless one is willing to believe that the difference in the optimal mark-ups
(arising from differences in the elasticities of demand) is itself a non-stationary variable.
Testing the stationarity of the cointegrating residual
pt —psi =1,..,n—1 (7)
thus provides additional information on the PTM model. A failure to reject stationarit
admits three explanations. First, the difference in the optimal mark-ups may indeed be
a non-stationary variable. Second, the statistical power of the unit root test may be too
low. Or third, the underlying model and the regression (5) may be mis-specified, leading
to potentially spurious results.
The first possibility cannot be dismissed out-of-hand. For example, with a demand
function exhibiting above unitary elasticity the mark-up depends upon the exchange rate
(which itself is often a non-stationary variable). Nonetheless, we find intuitively unappealing
to think of a potentially unlimited divergence of demand elasticities across markets over
time. Likewise, the second possibility likewise cannot be dismissed out of hand, although
-for our dataset- seventeen years of monthly data would seem to be a respectable number
of observations. To understand how the third possibility might occur it is useful to consider
an alternative model of pricing behavior.
2.2 Menu Costs





where K(.) is an indicator function which captures menu costs of price changes, and
where it is assumed that the firm sets the export price in terms of the destination market
currency. Menu costs are typically believed to consist of two components:informational
and administrative (see Cecchetti [1986]). Informational costs capture the inconvenience
imposed on customers —andthus the possible loss of sales —asprices are changed. Ad-
ministrative costs are associated with determining and implementing new prices (informing
distributors, and so forth). For a firm selling in multiple markets, there are likely to be
some economies of scale in regard to administrative costs, so that the average cost per price
change is declining in the total number of prices changes implemented at a given moment
in time.
Menu costs models of this form have been studied by a number of authors [inter alia,
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977,1983), Iwai (1981), Benabon (1988)1. These models suggest
that even very modest menu costs can lead to an sS pricing rule such that there will be a
band of "inactivity" in which prices are not altered even in the presence of rising costs and
higher general inflation. Delgado (1991), presenting simulation results for an international
extension of the sS model, finds that "with menu costs of the order of 1% of production
costs, the exchange rate can move 50% and prices will not be changed" [Delgado (1991:480)].
Furthermore, when prices are changed, they are not necessarily set at their unconstrained
optimum (i.e. the value which would have been chosen had there been no menu costs) if the
direction of future price changes is predictable. For example, with positive trend inflation
prices will usually be set above the unconstrained optimum since the firm expects that it
will want to raise prices in the future as well. In our context, however, relative prices across
markets are likely to be set at their unconstrained optimum (when prices are changed)
if the exchange rate follows a random walk without drift. A final important implication
of this model class, as stressed by Cecchetti [1986], is "history dependence": changes in
the exogenous variables since the previous price change —ratherthan contemporaneous
changes —determineprice setting decisions.
Consider, then, any period, t, in which the price in market i is not changed relative to
the reference price. Denoting the period of the previous change in price i relative to the








=e10—ea+ log(1 + ji,,) —log(1+ u,o) (9)
The equation illustrates three points. First, if the exchange rate itself is an 1(1)process,
the cointegrating residual will be non-stationary even when the difference in theoptimal
markups is 1(0). Second, one would find evidence of local currency price stabilization
(y < 0) even if firms are acting perfectly competitively (i.e. (1 + i,,)= (1+ jz,) =1)
when they do set prices. Third, when a group of firms pricing according to MC butaltering
pricing at different times are aggregated to obtain a broader price index, the regression
coefficientsobtained from the aggregate price index may be less than unity (in absolute
value).
Non-stationarity of the cointegrating residuals may thus simply reflect the temporary
foreign currency price stabilization implied by menu costs. We now turn to our dataset to
illustrate that the danger of misinterpretation may be quite relevant in practice.
3 The Data
The price dataset consists of the cover prices, in local currency, of The Economistmaga-
zine in eleven countries, Austria (AUS), Belgium (B EL), Denmark (DEN), France (FRA),
Germany (GER), Italy (ITA), the Netherlands (NET), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE),
Switzerland (SWI), and the United States (USA), with the United Kingdom serving as the
reference country. The sample covers the period from January 1973 to December 1990.2
Common currency conversions are based on International Financial Statistics (IFS) ex-
change rate series converted into local currency per Pound Sterling. Local CPI series were
likewise taken from tF..e IFS.
Table 1 provides some basic statistics for our sample. Columns [1], [2], and [3] report
the percentage changes in the local currency cover price, the localcurrency CPI, and the
exchange rate, respectively, over the entire sample period. Price changes range from a
2The sample endpoint reflects a change in the set of prices reported on the cover in January 1991.
9Table 1: Descriptive Statistics


















doubling in Germany to a more than eleven-fold increase in Italy, with the UK towards
the upper end. With the sole exception of the United States, the price change of The
Economist has exceeded the change in the overall consumer price index. The local price
change, relative to the UK price change, broadly tracks the exchange rate movement over
the sample: low (Economist price) inflation Austria, Germany, and Switzerland logged
appreciations between 60 and 70% while high inflation Italy depreciated by almost 60% vis
a vis Sterling.
Columns [4] to [7] report the maximum, minimum and average percentage change of the
local currency price and its standard deviation. Price changes display substantial variation,
ranging from -20% to +58%, with the standard deviation in several cases exceeding the
mean. A histogram reveals the majority of price changes to be in the 3 to 12% range.
Columns [8] to [11] report the maximum, minimum, average, and standard deviation of
the ratio of the (Sterling equivalent) of the foreign price to the Sterling price (that is, the
common currency relative price) in those months in which the foreign currency price was
changed. Again the data reveal substantial variability and do not immediately suggest
obvious trigger points. On average, price adjustments seem to be undertaken once the









































































































































First row: mean. econc1 row: stam ard deviation.
AUS: Austria, BEL: Belgium, DEN: Denmark, FRA: France, GER: Germany, ITA: Italy,
Netherlands, NOR: Norway, SWE: Sweden, SW!: Switzerland, UK: United Kingdom
Table 2 reports the mean relative price (and its standard deviation) across different
markets. With the exception of the UK prices (which are almost uniformly lower than
the price in any other country), the maximum deviation of the relative price from unity
is in the order of fifteen percent (which is roughly the same magnitude of the standard
deviation). The table serves primarily to remind us that, given the time-sensitive nature
of the product, these markets are generally segmented with international arbitrage possi-
bilities severely limited. For example, the relative price in Austria and Germany is very
close to unity (suggesting, perhaps, some local arbitrage possibilities) but the relative price
between France and the United States is the same as the relative price between France
and Switzerland, even though local arbitrage in the latter case must be much less costly.
The volatility of these relative prices, relative to their mean, is also revealing: they are
significantly higher for the United States and the United Kingdom —countrieswhose cur-
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Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation Of Bilateral Relative Price
NET:rencies floated against those of the other countries over much of the sample period. With
this simple characterization of the basic data in mind, we turn next to some formal tests
of pricing behavior.
4 Pricing To Markets
The evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 suggests strongly that the law of one price does
not hold continuously for The Economist. The purpose of this section is to determine —
usingthe methodology adopted by previous studies —whetherThe Economist is "priced-
to-market". We use two tests. The first examines whether the Sterling equivalent price
in different destination markets is affected by the Sterling exchange rate. Under the null
hypothesis of perfectly competitive behavior there should be no effect. The second test is
an "exchange rate pass-through" regression in which the local currency price is regressed
on the Sterling exchange rate. If exchange rate movements are not being offset then there
should be a unit coefficient on the exchange rate.
4.1Import-CurrencyPrice Stabilization Regressions
In order to test whether firms stabilize local currency prices we estimate both single time-
series and panel versions of equations (5) and (6). In the absence of transportation costs,
constants significantly different from zero (or the coefficients, Q,,inthe panel regressions)
could be interpreted as evidence in favor of PTM. Since we observe local currency retail
prices which are not independent of transportation costs, however, the interpretation of the
constants is less clearcut, a shortcoming this study shares with the literature at large.3
The main focus thus falls on the exchange rate coefficients Significantlynegative
coefficients are generally interpreted as evidence in favor of PTM. In an extreme case, a
coefficient of -1 would indicate that none of the Sterling appreciation had been allowed to
pass-through to import currency prices. Table 3 reports the results for the levels and the
first difference regression. (The row marked "panel" is a panel regression with coefficients
constrained to be equal across countries). The results are quite strong: the coefficient on
the exchange rate is always negative (at very high statistical levels of significance) and
is often close to -1.0. Within the PTM framework, this finding would be interpreted as
3An exception is Knetter (1993).
12Table 3: Pricing To Markets -LevelsAnd Growth Rates
Levels Growth Rates
CountryConst.TrendUK P.Exch. R2 (UK P.)i (Exch.)R2
AUS 2.70"0.004" 0.10-0.88"0.990.24" -0.90" 0.65
(35.70)(17.66)(4.77)(-42.63) (2.63) (-13.91)
BEL 2.03"0.001 0.76 -0.44"0.990.58" -1.05 0.52
(14.46) (2.41)" (18.51) (-13.44) (3.45) (-11.53)
DEN 2.00"0.00 0.84".0.67**0.980.49" 0.89** 0.50
(20.01) (0.76)(19.54) (-17.11) (3.18) (-11.73)
FRA 2.50**0.001"0.88".1.00"0.99Ø49** -1.12" 0.57
(44.88) (4.75)(32.25) (-39.41) (3.13) (-8.41)
GER 1.59**0.001"0.22"-1.11"0.990.20 -0.99" 0.59
(22.11) (3.88)(7.61)(-34.95) (1.54) (-13.64)
ITA 6.97"0.002"1.06" Ø9Q**0.980.61" -1.05" 0.40
(10.67) (3.92)(13.14) (-11.37) (2.94) (-7.53)
NET 1.87"-0.001" 0.68"-0.99"0.990.35" -0.96" 0.55
(26.65) (-3.92)(22.00) (-26.61) (2.61) (-16.76)
NOR 2.35"0.00 0.91"-0.85"0.97 0.42" -0.76" 0.25
(14.81) (0.50)(16.17) (-14.08) (2.19) (-5.61)
SWE 2.37"0.00 0.97"-0.86"0.97 0.66" -1.07" 0.46
(16.35) (.1.50)(21.51) (-15.77) (2.07) (-8.44)
SWI 1.13"0.003"0.12-0.93"0.980.29 -0.96" 0.38
(12.05) (4.17)(1.81)(-19.33) (1.42) (-11.19)
USA 1.37"-0.004" 1.00"-0.88"0.980.37" -0.98" 0.56














13evidence that producer altered home currency prices to stabilize foreign currency prices in
the face of exchange rate movements.
4.2 Exchange Rate Pass-Through Tests
We next turn to standard passthrough regressions. In these tests, the change in the local
currency price, is regressed on the change in the reference price, zpt, and the current
and lagged values of the change in the exchange rate:
k
/3'p + >2.fikE.eit_j +E, (10)
i=o
The passthrough elasticity at lag k is then given by y(k) = 7kand immediate
complete pass-through (i.e. no local currency price stabilization) implies 7(0) =1.Table 4
reports the y(12) coefficients -allowingfor some sluggish adjustment -forthe entire sample
period and separately for the 1973-79 and 1980-90 period. For the entire sample period
1
theestimated pass-through coefficient is well below unity in every case. The pass-through
coefficients rise in the second sub-sample in each case (with the exception of Belgium)
reflecting, perhaps, lower volatility of nominal exchange rates with the development of the
EMS.






































Both the PTM and the passthrough equations thus strongly indicate that nominal
exchange rate movements were not fully reflected in the export price.
We noted above that if (Sterling equivalent) export prices are being adjusted to offset
nominal exchange rate movements in each period —oneinterpretation of the above results
—thenthese prices should reflect the optimal mark-up. Excluding the (rather unlikely)
14possibility that the difference in the optimal markup across markets is non-stationary, it
follows that the equivalent currency price ratio should follow a stationary stochastic process.
Table 5 reports the twelve lag augmented Dickey Fuller statistics both for an "unrestricted"
test [Column 1] on the residual obtained from a regression of the Sterling equivalent foreign
price, p, on the Sterling price, Pt,andfor a "restricted" test [Column 2] in which a unit
coefficient on the Sterling price is imposed when calculating the cointegrating residual.
Column 3 reports the ADF statistic for the first difference specification.
Table 5: Co-Integration Tests (ADF)
[1] [2] [3]
AUS-3 20*-0 06 4 49**
BEL4.00**-3.024.0l**
DEN-2.88-2.553.25*
FRA3 34*4 654 83
GER.-3.04 1.09 4.29**
ITA-1.75-1.9 547**
NET-3 02-l 845 33**
NOR-2 16-1 344 21
SWE-2 73-3 05 -4 57**
SW!375**-0.553.86**
USA-2.42-1.276.2l*
A rejection of the unit
unrestricted and only one
ness of the PTM model.
5 Menu Costs
root —asimplied by (4) —isonly possible for four cases in the
case in the restricted version, casting doubt on the appropriate-
Regression tests of the form used above are not useful for distinguishing whether incomplete
passthrough arises from sluggish price adjustment in the presence of menu costs or reflects
deliberate attempts to offset nominal exchange rate movements. In order to distinguish
between these two possibilities we now turn to Probit analysis of the determinants of foreign
price increases. Specifically, we examine two testable hypothesis:
• History Dependence. In the MC model, the cumulative exchange rate movement
since the last price change will determine current prking decisions. In the PTM
15model, only the current exchange rate movement matters.
Let r denote the time period of the previous increase in the foreign price then, for any
variable Xg,wedefine= (2 — XT)/xT;that is, the percentage deviation in x since
the previous price change. Let z =(egg+pg) —pdenote the deviation from the law
of one price. Since there are transportation costs, the law of one price will not hold
exactly. However, if pricing decisions reflect menu costs rather than PTM decisions,
then what should matter for predicting the next price increase is the deviation from
the law of one price since the previous change. Thus we expect zj, rather than Z1jor
zzj,tohelp predict price increases.
Bunching Of Price Changes. In the PTM model, the decision to change a price in
country i is independent of whether prices in other countries are changed at the same
time. In the MC model, decreasing average menu costs suggest bunching of price
changes in a given period. The number of price changes in other markets (OTHER)
should thus enter positively in the Probit regression if menu costs are present, but
should be insignificant if PTM considerations are relevant.
In addition to the above mentioned variables, we include the local inflation rate, p,f,
and the change in the consumer price inflation since the last price change,as proxies
for PTM effects. Finally, we use the wholesale price inflation in the United Kingdom to
capture increases in production costs.4.
The results of the probit estimation are reported in table 5. For both hypothesis, the
evidence is strongly in favor of menu costs. Eqn [1] shows that the deviation since the
last price change is significant and of the correct sign, while the deviation itself enters
insignificantly. Similarly, it is the deviation of the exchange rate since the last price change,
rather than the change in the exchange rate itself which enters. The regressions thus
point strongly to the presence of history dependence. The second hypothesis is likewise
supported: the number of other price changes (OTHER) enter significantly and positively
4The Sterling price of The Economist is an alternative candidate, but will -under the null- itself suffer
from menu costs induced "stickiness". The overall price index, by averaging over a wide array of prices
adjusted at different times, is likely to be a better approximation. As a crude proxy, we also tried a linear
time-trend to capture changes in costs (following Knetter [1989]), the coefficient estimates and standard
errors for the other variable were almost identical.
16Table 6: Probit Estimation of Price Changes














































































Turning to the other variables, an increase in the UK wholesale price inflation,
or the consumer price inflation in the destination market, raises the probability of a
price increase. An increase in the consumer price index since the last price increase, fif,
controllingfor the other variables, decreases the probability of a price increase. This result
is counter-intuitive, but is similar to the findings of Cechetti [1986] in his study of magazine
pricing in the US market.
If sluggish price adjustments indeed reflects menu costs, and if firms did price compet-
itively when they did adjust prices, we would expect complete passthrough if we only look
at those months in which prices are actually adjusted. Table 5 reports the results obtained
by a panel regression of the change in the relative price in currency i to the Sterling price
between two months in which the foreign price was adjusted on the change in the exchange
rate between those two periods. To allow for some administrative lags between exchange
rate movements and subsequent price, we also report results using the depreciation rate six
months before the price change.
The exchange rate change between two price adjustments is seen to play a highly sig-
nificant role in determining relative price adjustment. For the contemporaneous change,
the unit coefficient cannot be rejected at the 10% level, for the six month leaded series, it












prices are adjusted- passthrough is complete. Comparing the results of table 5 with table 4
it is clear that low average passthrough resulting from looking at a sample combining "zero
passthrough" observations in most months with "complete" passthrough observations in
those months in which prices are changed may easily, but incorrectly, be interpreted as
evidence of pricing to market.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to distinguish between deliberate attempts at offsetting nominal
exchange rate movements, and inadvertent import-currency price stabilization stemming
from menu costs. The distinction is important because, inter alia, it determines the speed
of adjustment of the real exchange rate to nominal exchange rate movements (with the pre-
sumption being that deliberate pricing to market will cause longer lags in such adjustment).
Moreover, deliberate pricing to market is inconsistent with competitive behavior and, ar-
guably, borders on an unfair trade practice. Inadvertent price stabilization, in contrast, is
quite consistent with price-taking firms that cannot change prices frequently without in-
curring menu costs. We have also argued that standard tests can lead to spurious findings
of pricing to marketwhenmenu costs are present. The shortcomings of these tests may be
masked, moreover, due to aggregation problems when the price series are composite indices.
Using a panel dataset of prices in eleven countries for a single firm, we find that standard
pricing to market and exchangerate pass-throughtests may yield spurious results.
18
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